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October 1, 2003 
"I said in Seattle that the World Trade Organization (WTO) is medieval, but I'm now wondering whether 
Neolithic isn't a more appropriate term."[1]  
Pascal Lamy, European Union Trade Commissioner 
"We are told that trade can provide a ladder to a better life and deliver us from poverty and despair… 
Sadly, the reality of the international trading system does not match the rhetoric. "[2]  
Kofi Annan, Secretary General, United Nations 
"Many countries—developing and developed—were dismayed by the transformation of the WTO into a 
forum for the politics of protest.... The key division at Cancun was between the can-do and the won't 
do."[3]  
Robert Zoellick, United States Trade Representative 
Introduction 
The fairly representative quotes above reflect a growing disillusionment with the international trade 
system in general and the World Trade Organization (WTO) in particular. The WTO ministerial meeting in 
Cancun, Mexico (September 10-15, 2003) brought together delegates from 148 member countries and 
was intended as a general stock-taking session to assess the way to move forward in key areas such as 
tariff reduction on industrial products, agricultural reform, foreign investment rules, and competition 
policies. The meeting was part of a new round of world trade talks launched in Doha, Qatar in November 
2001 intended to focus on the needs of the developing countries. To the surprise of many, but not all, the 
conference collapsed in the face of fundamental differences between rich and poor nations.  
The financial implications of this breakdown are staggering. A recent World Bank study [4] projected that 
a new trade agreement would have a major impact on the global economy. The Bank's estimate is that an 
accord promoting free trade would produce for the world economy an annual income growth of between 
$290 billion and $520 billion. This income growth would lift approximately 144 million people out of 
poverty by 2015. In East Asia alone, free trade policies on agriculture, services, logistics, and trade 
facilitation would create annual benefits of $300 billion or 10% of the region's GDP within a decade.[5]  
Clearly, the happenings at Cancun require an assessment, not just of what went wrong at the meetings, 
but also of the broader issue of whether or not the existing structure of the WTO is up to the challenges 
ahead. With this in mind, this Strategic Insight will examine the main issues confronting delegates at the 
Cancun meetings. What were the main issues? The positions taken? The main reasons for failure? 
Based on this assessment, the final sections speculate as to the WTO's future with implications drawn 
from the lessons of Cancun.  
Main Issues on the Cancun Agenda 
The new round had a large, rather cluttered agenda. Several of the more important areas for discussion 
were to include:  
Agriculture  
Ministers were asked to agree on a framework for proceeding with negotiations on farm trade 
liberalization. Here the three main areas of debate were border protection, export subsidies and domestic 
support. The draft for discussion referred to the possible phasing out of export subsidies. It also 
envisaged cuts in domestic farm support that went well beyond what the EU had stated it could accept. 
Of these issues, developing country subsidies was perhaps the most contentious, pitting the rich nations 
against the poor ones. Many economists feel that the subsidies that developed countries pay to farmers 
increase supply and thus contribute to developing country poverty through lowering world prices of key 
products.[6] While developing nations want the developed countries to cut their subsidies, developed 
countries contend subsidy cuts must be matched by concessions from poor countries. These focus 
mainly on lowering tariffs on imports of manufactured goods.  
With regard to the extent of developed countries' farm subsidies, it is estimated that[7]: 
• The industrialized world spends $1 billion a day on agricultural subsidies.  
• In 2002, U.S. farm support was 17.6 percent of the total value of agricultural production, 
compared with 36.5 percent in the European Union, and 59 percent in Japan.  
• While the 1996 U.S. Freedom to Farm bill was designed to reduce payments to American farmers, 
between 1996 and 2002 payments grew 300 percent, to $22 billion. Under the 2002 U.S. Farm 
bill, Washington has allocated up to $190 billion more—over the next 10 years—for America's 
farmers.  
Particular attention was to be focused on cotton, stemming from a plea from four west African cotton-
producing countries—Burkina Faso, Benin, Chad and Mali—to eliminate the $6 billion a year now spent 
on cotton subsidies by the U.S., Europe and China. The four African countries contend their farmers are 
losing $250 million a year from subsidized competition and depressed world prices, while the overall cost 
to their economies could amount to $1 billion a year. They wanted the ministers in Cancun to agree a 
timetable for scrapping the subsidies, and compensation during the phase-out period—but the United 
States opposes a deal outside the main agricultural talks.  
Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA)  
The original purpose of the GATT was to create a multilateral trading system in which tariffs on industrial 
goods would be minimized as much as possible. At the Doha Ministerial, members raised concerns about 
the implementation of this goal. At the Cancun meetings ministers were to agree on a framework for 
proceeding with negotiations on opening markets for non-agricultural products—mostly industrial goods. 
Many spokesmen from the developing countries contend that developed country trade barriers are higher 
than theirs and hence the global trading system is unfair.  
A closer look at the levels of protectionism around the world presents a somewhat different picture. For 
trade in manufactures (excluding textiles and clothing), the developed countries average tariffs are 3% 
compared to 13% for the developing countries. Even in textiles and clothing, the poor-country tariffs at 
8% exceed the rich-country tariffs at 3%.[8]   
Singapore issues  
During the 1996 Singapore Ministerial, members agreed that the relationships between trade and 
competition and between trade and investment required further examination. Trade facilitation and 
transparency in government procurement were also set apart for further study. Three working groups 
were organized within the WTO to address these areas, but a decision on whether or not to formally 
integrate these four issues, now known as the Singapore Issues, into the WTO framework was delayed 
until Doha in 2001. It was there that the WTO recognized a "case for multilateral rules" in these areas, 
and mandated that decisions at the 5th Ministerial be reached as to whether negotiations on these issues 
could begin.  
Developing Country Issues  
In Doha, ministers asked negotiators to review WTO provisions on special and differential treatment for 
poor countries "with a view to strengthening and making them more precise, effective and operational". 
One concerns compulsory licensing of imported generic drugs for countries without domestic production 
capacity. The other two concern 'implementation' issues and 'special and differential treatment'. With 
regard to the drugs issue, some progress was made before the meetings. Negotiators agreed on a 
resolution that appears to allow poor nations to buy generic drugs from Brazil, India and other producing 
nations. Pharmaceutical companies, citing intellectual property rights, have historically resisted such 
plans, but global pressure forced the companies to change their position. At the Cancun conference, 
however, it was apparent that many technical details remained unresolved. 
Explanations for the Failed Talks 
As it turned out, talks in Cancun centered on five areas: agricultural subsidies, industrial tariffs, market 
access, investment and competition rules and special help for the poorest countries. Inside sources note 
that progress was minimal in many areas and time ran out to bring the opposing camps together.[9] 
Explanations abound for the failure of the member countries to arrive at an agreement despite the 
enormous potential benefits stemming from the completion of the Doha round.[10] By most accounts, in 
the final hours it was the African countries' refusal to accept talks on the Singapore issues which proved 
the greatest impediment to an agreement. However, the Cairns group of agricultural exporting countries 
was also reported to be refusing to reopen talks on agriculture, believing the deal on the table was to 
favorable for the protected markets of the EU and the United States.[11] 
Many more subtle, not necessarily mutually exclusive, factors have also been suggested for the failure of 
the Meetings:  
Sluggish World Economy 
General world economic conditions in the last several years have not been conducive to advances in 
trade liberalization. In 2001, the year talks got underway, the world economy contracted by 6.5 percent. 
While the world economy is picking up, there is still great hesitancy in some quarters to expose struggling 
firms and their workers to increased competition.  
US/EU Conflicts 
Second is the continuing conflict over key issues between the United States and the European Union 
(EU). In the bigger scheme of things, many of these seem petty—banana wars, export subsidies for 
American companies (the so-called Foreign Sales Corporation case in the WTO), disagreements over 
data and privacy protection in telecommunications and more recently over genetically modified organisms. 
One could go on. Clearly, the United States and the EU have moved from an era of Cold War cooperation 
to a more adversarial post-Cold War era of competition.  
The Group of 21 (G21) 
Third is the increased role that the developing countries are now playing in the multilateral system and in 
the WTO.[12] While 80 of the member countries are classified as developing, many are too weak 
economically to have much influence. On the other hand a group of 21 countries (G21), including China, 
India, Brazil, South Africa, Korea and Egypt have emerged as a fairly cohesive block of countries.[13] 
This group differs sharply with the more developed countries over a wide spectrum of issues, and as a 
result the developed countries were not able to easily have their way on a number of key issues. Many in 
the developed countries cited the G21's unwillingness to bend as the main cause of the Cancun debacle. 
Significantly, this group and many other member developing countries feel that the previous round of 
trade negotiations, the Uruguay round that ended in 1994, treated them unfairly and have been highly 
damaging to their economies. Barfield notes that under the Uruguay round of talks developing countries 
were promised increased trade in agriculture and textiles and apparel in exchange for agreeing to new 
rules in services, intellectual property and health and safety measures. "What they subsequently 
discovered was that in agriculture, virtually no liberalization actually occurred and in textiles and apparel 
the deadlines were back-loaded and didn't kick in for a decade[14]," The result is that they have 
demanded compensation and roll-back of some Uruguay trade rules as a condition for undertaking any 
new obligations in the Doha round. 
As noted above, the Doha round was supposed to address the concerns of the developing countries. It 
was actually dubbed the Doha Development Round. In retrospect, expectations among the developing 
nations may have been raised too high. Perhaps because of this many of the developing nations at the 
Cancun trade talks were not willing to offer anything in return for promised concessions from the rich 
nations.  
In any case, the developing countries for the first time in twenty years were beginning to unite in a 
common bargaining position. Whether these countries will resurrect something along the lines of the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) remains to be seen. Ironically, the NIEO was effectively ended after 
a 1982 conference at Cancun. 
Overloaded Agenda  
Fourth, as the WTO system has evolved, items open for negotiation and new forms of protectionism have 
increased. The push for free trade has been overwhelmed by calls for fair trade, investment rules, labor 
agreements, intellectual property regimes, pharmaceutical pacts and scores of other issues. As 
Bardhan[15] notes, many of the complaints lodged by the South are better served with other international 
agencies. In any case, to roll all these into an already overloaded agenda is to invite more Cancun-type 
disasters.[16]  
A variant of this theme is the overly complex nature of many of the new issues now opening for debate. 
Many of the developing countries just do not have the manpower to dissect all of the agreements and 
clauses proposed by the developed countries. To effectively participate at the meetings, each country 
now needs a small army of lawyers, accountants, writers and other professionals—manpower they simply 
can not afford. Referring to the investment proposals submitted at Cancun, Bhagwati noted that "When I 
looked through the investment agreements, it was worse than reading my insurance policy for the fine 
print. I couldn't make anything out of it, and I'm a reasonably informed person, a pretty smart economist 
as they go."[17] 
Role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).  
Finally, other observers like Franz Fischer, European Union farm commissioner, put a great deal of the 
blame on the hundreds of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) who denounced the WTO for what 
they said was its subservience to big business and indifference to the poor. Whether intentional or not , 
Fischer observed that "the NGOs gave the impression that no deal was better than a bad deal—there 
was no preparedness to change positions."[18] Along the same lines, de Jonquieres observed that: 
The battle line has been intensified by many poor countries' reliance on advice from activist groups 
openly hostile to the WTO and free markets. When the Cancun talks collapsed, activists and African 
delegates whooped for joy—even though poor countries lost most.[19] 
Future Scenarios 
A number of scenarios are plausible for the WTO. Each is based on implicit assumptions concerning the 
desire of member countries to move ahead in the liberalization of world trade and the development of 
lower income countries. 
North/South Split 
Based on a continuation of developments at Cancun, this is not a particularly optimistic scenario. As 
noted above, the WTO works by consensus. Unfortunately, there are no formal procedures to arrive at a 
joint agreement. Under these circumstances, the WTO would likely become another bureaucratic agency 
continually presiding over North/South issues with no real resolution. The increasingly polarized 
ideological gaps (the Neo-liberal and Structural lines in Figure 1) between the rich and poor would be too 
major to accommodate any type of consensus other than on the most trivial of issues. In this scenario, the 
North perhaps under U.S. prodding, would largely adhere to neo-liberal economic principles of free trade 
and open markets advancing a pro-globalist agenda while dismissing the structuralist more anti-globalist 
arguments of the South as unsound.  
Likely outcomes would be the creation of more and more bi-lateral trade deals, and regional trading 
groups. The WTO would become marginalized or at best seriously weakened. Clearly, if the North and 
South could agree on a common approach to development and trade, perhaps through blending the 
sound portions of neo-liberalism (efficiency) with those of structuralism (governmental safety-nets and 
assistance) into some sort of policy consensus (the Policy Consensus line in Figure 1), a major stumbling 
block in arriving at an agreement would be eliminated and the WTO would be a much more effective 
organization as a result. Given the fact that extreme versions of both the neo-liberal and structural models 
have been largely discredited[20], this scenario is not as far-fetched as it might seem. Many of the recent 
writings of Joseph Stiglitz, former Nobel Prize winner and former head economist at the World Bank, have 
focused on developing just this sort of framework.[21] 
EU Dominance/US Ambivalence  
In this scenario, the EU gradually captures the WTO agenda, while the United States largely abandons 
the organization to pursue an agenda of bilateral and regional deals. Rather than achieving or even 
pursuing any dramatic new ground in trade liberalization, the WTO would become bogged down in 
Singapore type issues—standards harmonization and regulatory overload—meetings would become long, 
drawn-out, and infrequent. The WTO would become an increasingly irrelevant force in world trade. There 
is a good chance this scenario will play out in some form. 
Strengthening the WTO Financially  
The WTO differs from the other Bretton Woods Institutions in that it has no real power, i.e. financial 
leverage over the member countries. Both the IMF and the World Bank can provide a number of financial 
inducements for member countries to undertake reforms, adopt rational economic policies and the like. 
The WTO as constructed largely relies on the good will of the member countries. It is ironic that even 
though billions of dollars of increased income were likely to be generated by a successful conclusion to 
the Doha round, there was so little interest on the part of a large number of the poorer countries. Clearly 
many of these countries perceived that, as in the case of the Uruguay round, the initial impact of the Doha 
treaty would be to reduce their incomes even further. If the WTO were empowered to tax only part of the 
billions of dollars in income gains from a trade round and then compensate the losers (or even the 
relatively low winners) of the round, this would bring many of the developing countries back to the 
bargaining table. Clearly, this scenario would require the member countries ceding a certain amount of 
national sovereignty to the international organization. In addition, there would be a number of operational 
issues involved in identifying trade related income and the proper taxes to apply—no simple task on 
technical or political grounds.  
Strengthening and Restructuring the WTO Out of Necessity 
In addition to providing the WTO with an independent source of funding, member countries might cede 
much greater authority to the WTO, with world trade ultimately resembling inter-state trade in the United 
States, or to a lesser extent the current EU. This of course is an extreme solution and one not likely in the 
near future. However ultimately it may be necessary if the process of increased world economic 
integration globalization is to proceed smoothly. Here Rodrik argues increased globalization might 
encounter the so-called "trilemma" or international trade-off problem.[22]  
Originally the trilemma analysis was applied to the international financial system (Figure 2, Financial 
Trilemma) where it was argued that on technical grounds of the three goals— (a) monetary autonomy or 
economic national sovereignty; (b) stable exchange rates; and (c) goal of free capital flows or greater 
international economic integration—only two could be achieved simultaneously. For example, if a country 
pursued an independent monetary policy and increased its money supply at a greater rate than its major 
trading partners, domestic interest rates would fall and capital would flow out of the country seeking 
higher rates of return. Capital outflows would place great pressure on the exchange rate, ultimately 
forcing a devaluation of the country's currency. In other words, macroeconomic fundamentals dictate that 
the three goals are not attainable simultaneously.  
According to Rodrik, the same dilemma applies to further globalization. (Figure 2, Rodrik Trade Trilemma). 
Here Rodrik assumes countries are constrained to just two goals of three: (a) further economic integration; 
(b) the social contract—high levels of social spending; and (c) national sovereignty. If nations opt for 
national sovereignty and high social spending, they must take steps to impede integration. If they do not, 
their higher tax rates (to fund the expenditures) will result in their losing investment to countries with lower 
public spending and levels of taxation. This is the localism[23] option often championed by the anti-
globalists. On the other hand, if nations opt for sovereignty and integration, they must scale down social 
programs—the "golden straitjacket" coined by Thomas Friedman.[24] 
If nations opt for social programs and deeper economic integration then they would have to give up 
considerable sovereignty to strengthen and expand the authority of the WTO in ways that would allow 
that institution to set international standards, norms, rules for trade and the like—otherwise there would 
be a "race to the bottom," with governments cutting social expenditures, allowing the environment to 
deteriorate, and so on to enable them to remain competitive with lower wage countries. 
While all this sounds plausible, casual empiricism suggests that the "race to the bottom" and the Rodrik 
trilemma is more of a political constraint than an economic one. In the financial trilemma, there were 
strong, stable market forces that precluded the achievement of a fixed exchange rate, capital flows and 
an independent monetary policy. That does not appear to be the case with the so-called trade trilemma. 
Most of the developed countries sustain high levels of social spending, yet remain quite competitive due 
to their ability to innovate, and sustain rapid increases in productivity[25]—there are simply more degrees 
of freedom than in the monetary case. 
In short, a strengthening/restructuring of the WTO out of pure economic necessity is unlikely—it is hard to 
see how the developed countries would cede a considerable degree of sovereignty in the absence of any 
serious, exogenous economic constraints on social spending forcing them in this direction. 
Enlightened Unilateral Strengthening of the WTO 
Any proposed fundamental change to the WTO structure or scope of responsibility has to confront the 
fact that: 
Any one of the organization's 148 members can hold up any aspect of any negotiation. Efforts to create 
smaller informal groups are decried as "non-transparent" by those left out. Not surprisingly, this lends 
itself more to grandstanding than to serious negotiation. The worst problem, though, is that the WTO's 
requirement for consensus makes it virtually impossible for it to be reformed.[26] 
Enlightened unilateralism is summed up by a quote from the famous Cambridge economist Joan 
Robinson who observed that "if your trading partner throws rocks into his harbor that is no reason to 
throw rocks into your own."[27] As noted above much of the discontent at Cancun centered on the 
South's perceived hypocrisy of the North. Perhaps the best thing that the United States and other like-
minded countries can do to strengthen the WTO is to simply set a good example. 
Unilaterally reducing tariffs and other trade barriers is an obvious place to start, but there are many other 
and possibly more politically acceptable courses of action. In the context of the Cancun furor over 
agricultural subsidies in the developed countries, the United States for example might consider a 
particularly creative approach suggested by Amity Shlaes.[28] Her notion is that "it is time to take a truly 
radical and multinational step—pension off the farmers".[29] As she notes, this idea is not as wild as it 
may seem. The U.S. Senate has already authorized a buy-out program for tobacco growers. As it stands 
now U.S. subsidy programs transfer to farmers on average the equivalent of $16,000 per annum. Shlaes 
suggests a buyout of 15 years worth of subsidies in one payment—or $240,000. With this payment, 
protectionism and subsidies would end. In the longer-term, of course this is a much cheaper solution than 
perpetuating the dole. Actions like this might convince the South of the sincerity of the advanced 
countries in promoting free trade.  
Conclusions 
The WTO meeting in Cancun provided a vivid illustration of how the North and the South are drifting apart 
due to diverging agendas and the lack of political will to bridge the gap.[30] In addition to the staggering 
loss of potential income to be derived through a successful trade treaty, this situation is particularly 
unfortunate given the fact that a recent public opinion survey indicated that large majority in 38 of 44 
countries surveyed in the summer of 2002 thought growth global trade and business ties were good 
rather than bad for their country.[31] Interestingly, there was strong support for global commerce in 
France (88%), Brazil (73%) and India (69%), countries that have been critical of the current Doha 
negotiations and were instrumental in the collapse of the Cancun Meetings. Given this, it is especially 
troubling in that:  
The breakdown was entirely unnecessary. Trade ministers were not trying to come to a final agreement 
on the Doha round; they were not even making difficult choices about exactly how far to open their 
economies. The purpose of Cancun was far more limited: to be no more than a mid-course stock-taking, 
a time to agree on principles for taking negotiations forward. It is extraordinary, and all the more shameful, 
that ministers failed to do this.[32] 
While it is possible to visualize of a number of future alternatives for the WTO, it is very hard to be 
optimistic that the organization will arise from the ashes of Cancun and move ahead to complete the 
Doha agenda on schedule.  
Barring any fundamental change in the organization, several lessons have come out of this experience:  
1. Cancun in particular, and the Doha round in general demonstrates the growing limitations of the 
WTO as a force for trade liberalization. For years the United States, Europe and Japan 
cooperated to move the organization forward with new trade agreements. However, this model of 
negotiation has hit diminishing returns; it is becoming less and less effective.  
2. The main problem facing the WTO is the disparity between its members' levels of income and 
development—one size will not fit all and the organization must tailor make its policies and rules 
for individual groupings of countries.[33]  
3. Partially because of these disparities, it is absurd to push as the EU has done to impose rules in 
complex areas such as competition and investment on countries that do not have the 
infrastructure (manpower) to bargain effectively. 
4. The G-21 is a force to be reckoned with. They and many other developing countries will no longer 
be passive participants, especially on issues that affect their development process.[34] 
5. Special attention to the special problems of some developing countries should not be interpreted 
as general license to avoid trade competition.[35]  
In terms of the future, several policy shifts should be considered:  
1. Ministers should focus on economic gains to be derived from freeing trade—perceived trilemma 
tradeoffs are an illusion and no reason to expand negotiations into such areas as labor standards, 
environmental conditions and the like. These issues should be dealt with in issue specific forums 
such as the International Labor Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization etc.  
2. The top 20 importers (with the EU counted as one) account for 80 percent of world merchandise 
imports and the top 50 for 92 percent. Procedures in the WTO should focus on an agreement 
between the top 30 or so traders, with the other countries not automatically bound to the 
agreement.[36] It makes no sense to allow a country with less than 0.1 percent of world trade to 
derail the whole process.  
3. A similar principle would apply to market access. The best policy would be to offer barrier-free 
access to the small traders. If this impossible, simply extend any agreed liberalization to them 
within the principle of non-discrimination.  
4. To achieve good will amongst the member countries the United States as well as other developed 
countries should open up their economies unilaterally.[37] This is simply good economics. More 
importantly, once the developing countries experience the practical benefits of increased trade, 
there is a good chance they will come to the table with more motivation to arrive at a constructive 
treaty.[38]  
 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Europe, Africa, East Asia, and Latin America Resources. 
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